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By 
B. R. Bolnick 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores some case studies of Harambee activity in 
pre-Independence America (pre-1776) to illustrate some interesting 
parallels with Kenyan self-help. An attempt is then made to distill 
from the examples a socio-economic theory of the basis for voluntary 
provision of collective consumption goods, contrasting greatly with 
traditional theories of "free rider" motivation. Finally conclusions 
are drawn concerning the nature of Harambee in Kenya and possibilities 
for more rational channelling of Harambee energies,. This paper was 
originally prepared for the East African Universities Social Science 
Council Conference, Dar es Salaam, December 1973. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Although it is unclear from recent writings by social scientists 
whether self-help, at least in Kenya, is a boon or a bane, the importance of 
the Harambee phenomenon for rural development is unquestioned. The extent 
of Harambee, its prodigal vitality, prodigious problems, and vast potential 
(if properly harnessed) have been commented on in many sources. Little 
attempt has been made, however, to examine evidence of similar self-help 
movements in other cultural and historical settings, to draw generalisations 
concerning the nature of voluntary collective behaviour and to apply these 
insights to the particular problems of self-help in Kenya. Such an under-
taking is the purpose of this paper, tempered by two caveats: because it is 
a large undertaking we shall have to be content with a rather sketchy 
excursion into comparative self-help, and because we seek generalisations, 
the theory we shall examine will not explain all the varied details of 
Harambee. 
It should be noted at the outset that we accept Harambee as a 
"non-optimal" use of resources. Theories of collective behaviour have 
convincingly demonstrated that public goods which are provided through 
2 
voluntary efforts will not be supplied efficiently. The appropriate 
question, given the existence of the Harambee spirit, is whether it can 
be utilised more efficiently. We shall return to this question later. 
HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES 
Kenya is justifiably renowned for its self-help activities. But 
self-help is surely not confined to Kenya. It is to be found currently in 
developing countries throughout the world, often masquerading under the 
3 
label of community development projects. Furthermore, it is not uncommon 
in primitive societies. In this paper, we shall examine a more unexpected 
1- See, for example, 2, 13, 14, 15. 
2. "Efficiency" is defined as follows: the marginal rate of trans-
formation of the collective consumption good into some numeraire private 
good must equal the sum of the corresponding marginal rate of substitution 
over all individuals. For a helpful explanation, see 24, chapter 7. By 
"public goods" here we do not refer solely to the "pure" case. The existence 
of exclusion problems is the vital" characteristic for our purposes. If the 
good being provided falls into the category of a "club", where it can be jointly 
supplied to many individuals, but without net external benefits being generated, 
voluntary provision, with exclusion of non-contributors, can be efficient. See 11. 
Some Harambee projects, such as cattle dips, fall into this category. Traditional 
utility theory can be used to describe behaviour regarding such goods. In this 
paper we are more concerned with behaviour relating to "social" and "merit" wants, 
to use Musgrave's (19 59) terms. 
3. See 4 for numerous interesting case studies. 
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case - Harambee in pre-Independence America (i.e., pre-1776). A series of 
case studies is presented, chosen to illuminate interesting parallels between 
problems of Kenyan Harambee and problems of self-help in a very different 
environment. We shall begin with an examination of primary education, 
focussing on Boston and Philadelphia; this example provides insights into the 
relationship between government and voluntary effort. Secondly, we shall 
look at the founding of Harvard College and the provision of higher education 
in general to see the problems of finance which were faced and the un-
controlled blossoming of redundant institutions. Third, we examine the 
establishment of the Philadelphia Fire Department, which provides a case of 
public zeal swamping government plans. Finally, the evolution of the 
Philadelphia Hospital shows how innovations can be translated into Harambee 
activity and how government can aid in the process. Many more cases could 
be described, but for the limitations of space. 
Before proceeding, a brief description of the pre-Independence 
political and social climate in Boston and Philadelphia is in order. Both 
Boston (about 1630) and Philadelphia (about 1690) were founded by religious 
groups, and both therefore began as very cohesive, homogeneous communities. 
Because of immigration, war and the fact that they were seaports, both towns 
by the early years of the 18th century had outgrown their early parochial 
character and had become religiously, socially and economically heterogeneous 
communities. The political differences between the two towns are more 
important for our purposes. In Boston, there was quickly established a demo- • 
cratic local government (and Colonial government as well) with relatively 
extensive franchise. The government had the power to tax and was structured 
in such a way that the citizenry had an effective political outlet for 
satisfaction of pressing social needs. In contrast, Philadelphia colonists 
were faced with a medieval corporate form of municipal government, with greatly 
circumscribed powers of taxation and a very narrow, aristocratic franchise. 
Effectively then, the citizens of Philadelphia had little or no political 
recourse for the satisfaction of their needs. Given this background let us 
proceed to a discussion of American Harambee. 
4 
Case 1. In both Boston and Philadelphia, strong European traditions favouring 
education were brought to the New World by the settlers. Although based on 
religious beliefs in both towns , the value placed on education was translated 
into action in very different ways , the difference being dictated by the 
political environments outlined above. 
For details, see 7, 3 and "16 „ 
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In Boston, the first "free school" was established in 1642 by-
voluntary subscription of 45 wealthy citizens., The town government granted 
land to provide income and the following year took over full responsibility. 
More schools were set up by the town government in 1684 and 1686, and 
education became the major item in the town's budget. Four more elementary 
and secondary schools were established by 1720. All were inspected and 
provided for by the town, with good physical facilities and good salaries for 
the masters.^ Fees were charged but were waived for the poor. This rapidly 
expanding network of public schools meant that the competing private schools 
atrophied, leaving the town with an excellent education system financed by 
taxation. 
In Philadelphia, an equally fine supply of educational facilities, 
both in quantity and quality, was established with essentially no government 
participation. The impetus here was from the Quakers (Society of Friends), 
who highly valued elementary education. The first school, open to the whole 
community, was begun in 1689 with the hiring of a Master. He was allowed 
to charge tuition on the condition that the poor were tutored free of charge. 
Over the next few decades the school expanded, facilities were built, and 
scholarships were offered to the poor who would otherwise have had to work. 
In 1701 the school received a charter from the founder of the Colony, but 
still received no government support at all. Concurrently a large number and 
variety of schools for men and women, providing vocational and academic 
training, were established by other sectarian groups, all thriving on 
voluntary subscriptions, gifts and legacies. Primary education here, without 
any tax aid or official regulation, was among the best and most liberal (practical) 
in the colonies (in the opinion of education historians). 
While many of these schools were open to the general public, they 
were controlled by church groups. In 1741, the first non-sectarian school 
was opened, financed by philanthropic contributions. Then in 1749, following 
publicity in the press, subscriptions were taken for a major non-sectarian 
school. The donors and the board represented a cross section of many faiths, 
and the school was widely supported, especially by the wealthier citizens, 
5. Not all Massachusetts schools were as well endowed. One New 
England town in 1725 voted at a town meeting that a teacher be hired. A 
motion to provide the teacher with the same salary as the minister failed, 
as did successive motions for a salary of £40, £30,£20 and £5. Finally £3 
was voted. It is unlikely that they got a first class teacher. See 
16, chapter IX. * 
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even those with no direct self interest (i.e., children). The municipal 
government limited its involvement to a contribution (totalling less than 
10% of the pledge) and a resolution congratulating the public spirit of the 
benefactors. This school, called the Philadelphia Academy, quickly grew to 
include a large charity school and a fine secondary school which in 179 3 
added the College of Philadelphia (at the time the only non-sectarian college 
in the Coloniesnow the University of Pennsylvania). Finance (excluding 
the government's initial gift) was entirely through voluntary collection in 
the Colony and in England, plus lotteries. 
Looking beyond these two special cases, there was little trace of 
government support for education in the Colonies. Even after Independence, 
over 70 years were required before government control and finance began to 
take seed. In spite of the urging of America's greatest leaders, such as 
Washington, Adams ("Education is so extremely wise and useful that ... no 
expense for this purpose would be though extravagant.") and Jefferson, the 
public's aversion to taxation and the tradition of charity (which relieved 
pressures for government action) delayed the evolution of public education. 
Where such government support was lacking, schools were characterised by short 
terms, poor equipment, and inadequately trained teachers, although education 
did in fact reach much of the population in many states. 
6 
Case 2. On October 26, 1636, the Great and General Court of the Governor 
and Company of the Massachusetts Bay in New England passed a resolution founding 
a college at Newtowne (now Cambridge) for the training of ministers. A gift of 
£400 from the General Court (half of the colony's budget for that year) was 
voted (in fact not fully paid until 1649). Aside from the initial gift and the 
rights to ferry fees of about £35 per year after 1641, Harvard College, opened 
in 16 37, had to struggle for funds to see the light of day. The name Harvard 
was taken from an early benefactor who died 
in 1639 and left an estate of £780 
in the form of debts receivable and lands in England. In fact by 1640 much 
of the early funding had been somehow squandered by the first master; and the 
school was by no means on its feet. Occasional gifts came in from rich 
colonists and from England, but no income generating properties were forthcoming. 
Furthermore much of what was given was not terribly liquid. The Court's gift 
was paid from rates (taxes) collected from the farmers in the form of low grade 
corn and wheat. Also, since the College had no treasury, legacies and gifts 
6. For details, see 18 and 12. 
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from other sources were deposited with the Court. Due to a general cash 
shortage in the Colony, the Court would spend the money deposited; when 
withdrawal from account was demanded by the College, the Court would meet 
its obligation out of tax revenues. So the College would once again receive 
grain, with interest. 
In 1641, a mission to England raised only £300 in books and gifts. 
In desperation the new and honest master turned to an informal confederation 
of New England Colonies and asked for aid. The Colonies passed non-binding 
resolutions advertising the plight of the College which resulted in a 
phenomenal amount of voluntary contribution; small farmers all over New 
England each donated one peck of wheat to maintain the College. Enough 
wheat was given in that year and for the next seven years to support fully 
7 
the teaching staff of the College and ten to twelve scholarship students. 
By 1647 the gifts began to wane as it became apparent that most of the 
graduates were going abroad; but the College had survived its initial crisis. 
Later gifts, mostly from rich merchants who "could afford the luxury of 
philanthropy" (12, p.12), were sufficient to maintain the College, and 
donations of land gave the College a steady flow of income. 
Looking more generally at the birth of higher education in America, g 
state support was largely absent before Independence. Most schools struggled 
for funds, using a variety of devices, including lotteries (which most of the 
theocratic communities considered to be immoral), subscription lists, legacies, 
gifts, honourary degrees, tuition and lists of patrons. Most successful though 
were organised fund raising campaigns, bothat home and abroad. Also very lucra-
tive was competition among towns for the honour of having a college. Brown and 
Rutgers Universities found homes in this way. 
As wealth grew, many individuals took up the practice of establishing 
their own colleges. By the time of the Civil War (1861) there were 173 permanent 
colleges competing for funds. On balance this resulted in low quality for most 
7. The town of Salem passed a resolution wherein the voters "Ordered and 
Agreed that all such as God Stirres up in their hearts to contribute to the 
College at Cambridge..." should bring gifts. Nothing at all was given, and this 
was the only town in New England which failed altogether to contribute. Signifi-
cantly, Salem had been Cambridge's sole rival for the location of the college. 
8. Only William and Mary College in Virginia was state supported. In 
trying to raise money for the venture in England, an agent of the Virginia 
Assembly approached the Custodian of the Crown Purse and was rebuffed by a curt 
"Damn your souls! Raise Tobacco!" See 16, chapter IV. 
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of the schools since resources were spread too thin to maintain adequate 
standards. Yet this was acceptable given the robust growth and prevailing 
philosophy of the time: "If a college attracts to itself patronage and endow-
9 ment, it has a right to live; if it does not, it will die". 
Case 3 . A s in all urban areas, fire control was vital to the progress of 
nascent Philadelphia. In 1696 the municipal government required all house-
holds to supply themselves with a ladder and buckets. Municipal authorities 
were provided with extra equipment and authority to blow up houses to prevent 
the spread of fire (a popular method of control). Recompense for houses blown 
up came from the town. In addition town inspectors checked chimneys (a major 
source of fires) and the Corporation (government) used fines for more equipment. 
In 1718 the first fire engine was purchased by the Corporation. Thus first 
steps toward fire control were taken at the initiative of the government. 
The first sign of Harambee fire control came in 1730 when the 
Corporation decided more equipment was needed on a large scale. Rather than 
levy a tax, the Corporation raised funds through a public subscription. 
Later that year following a major fire, the government determined that three 
more engines were needed and this time resorted to taxation. But "to ease 
the inhabitants" another subscription was used to reduce the burden. The town 
now had four engines, housed and maintained at public expense. Soon there-
after, government involvement began to atrophy in the face of large-scale 
self-help efforts. 
isr 
One of Philadelphia's civic leaders (unconnected with government or 
with the church, to be sure) was Benjamin Franklin. In 1736 he suggested in 
the press that local fire control was inadequate, relying as it did on ad hoc 
groups of citizens to man the public equipment. As a remedy, Franklin proposed 
a meeting to set up a volunteer fire department. Initially 30 men formed a 
company, meeting monthly and purchasing equipment through contributions and 
fines for absenteeism. Soon other groups were forming companies, combining 
civic responsibility with socialising on a regular basis. Starting in 1739, 
these volunteer companies began to purchase their own engines and controlled 
activity in the city to the extent that in 174-9 the city-owned facilities came 
under their inspection. By 1752 the volunteer companies broadened their scope 
to include extension of credit to fire victims. Before the Revolutionary War, 
over 500 men belonged to volunteer companies, and these became the focus for 
9. From a 1877 pamphlet on higher education; cited in 23. 
10. For details see 7, 8 and 9. 
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philanthropic and political activity in the city."'""'" Through self-help 
efforts, Philadelphia became the safest city in the world with regard to fires, 
in spite of the' fact that the government did essentially nothing t<£ aid the 
movement during the last 4-0 years 6flColoniat Fule~ ac&uaoe:£iafal\lseMihelpd£nduced 
apathy on the part of the authorities• 
12 
Case 4. Prior to 1748 hospital facilities throughout the Colonies were 
limited to "pest houses" for quarantine of obviously contagious diseases. 
The need for public health facilities was simply not recognised, making 
hospital provision an unlikely target for self-help activity. In Philadelphia, 
the Colonial Assembly had built a pest house in 1732, and in the same year an 
Alms House was built largely by public subscription and a loan from the Assembly 
which provided some medical services for the poor. 
In 1748 a Philadelphia physician, Dr. Thomas Bond, returned from 
England having viewed some European hospitals. He felt that a hospital which 
would offer intensive care facilities to the community at large would be of 
great service to Philadelphia, and so he enlisted Benjamin Franklin's aid in 
organising the project. Franklin at first promoted a public subscription 
after some initial publicity in his newspaper of the need for, and benefits of, \ 
a hospital but because the idea was foreign to the citizens the subscription 
was a total failure. After this setback, Franklin took the idea to the 
Colonial Assembly. He proposed a public hospital to be open to citizen and 
stranger alike, but the Assembly, controlled by rural interests, was not keen 
to grant money which would largely benefit the city. So Franklin changed course 
and finally got the Assembly to grant £2000 capital, the interest to be used 
for operating expenses, if Franklin could raise the sa»e amount for construction 
of the facility. Apparently the Assembly, noting the poor response to the 
initial subscription, did not expect to be called upon to make good its promise. 
However Franklin, armed with this promise and benefitting from a few intervening 
years of publicity during which the idea had spread, easily raised the necessary 
sum by public subscription in 1751. In fact he raised £4,750. The hospital 
opened in 1752 and continued to receive active public support, so that in 1754 
the Directors could report that "few of the Wealthy, or those of the middling 
Rank, failed of contributing according to their circumstances". The hospital 
was open.-to all on either a paying or charity basis except for those with 
11. It is interesting to note that New York City (which the British took from 
the Dutch in 1664) had no fire fighting equipment until 1730, and very little until 
1737 when some municipal buildings were destroyed. The Gbrporatibn quickly levied a 
tax to buy two new engines and 100 buckets. 
12. See 9 for details. 
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incurable or infectious diseases; in fact patients came from as far away as 
Virginia. An historian of the period has concluded that Philadelphia, through 
self-help supported (if unintentionally) by the government, achieved an array 
of medical services seldom equalled anywhere relative to the size of the community. 
A THEORY OF HARAMBEE 
The above cases clearly refer to situations quite different from 
those found in Kenya today. In the first place, they all refer to urban areas 
in contrast to the rural nature of Kenya's Harambee movement. Secondly, the 
Colonial seaport towns were quite wealthy compared to Kenya's rural areas. 
As we have seen, wealthy merchants and gentry were vital to the success of the 
self-help efforts in America. Yet these important differences should not deter 
us from abstracting some basic insights about the nature of voluntary provision 
of collective goods and applying these insights to Kenya. 
A basic lesson to be learned from our study is that the standard 
theory of public goods interaction cannot help us to understand self-help 
behaviour. Glancing at some of the conclusions of the public goods literature, 
we can see how irrelevant these analyses are to the problem at hand. Musgrave, 
referring to social wants, has concluded, "...everyone knows that his benefit 
will be independent of his particular contribution. Hence... he cannot be 
relied upon to make a voluntary contribution." (20, p.10) Elsewhere, Musgrave 
has commented that the truth of this proposition is evident given the "very 
fact that such enforcement [of taxation/ appears to be universally necessary". 
(19, p.220) Regarding less-than-pure public goods (merit wants), Samuelson 
has concluded that "it is in the selfish interest of each person to give false 
signals, to pretend to have less interest in a given collective consumption 
activity than he really has" (22, p.338), leading to what is necessarily a subj 
optimal supply of any such good. In such analyses, one cannot find explanations 
for the excess provision of Harambee schools in Kenya or colleges in the US. 
In order to develop a theory of Harambee then, we have to turn to a 
more appropriate analysis of the nature of social interaction which can lead 
an individual to contribute to a Harambee project in blatant disregard of free 
13 rider rationality. To understand how voluntary provision of collective 
13. The free rider theory has been the basis of the theory of public goods 
provision since 19 39. It fundamentally denies that rational individuals will 
voluntarily support a collective consumption good (or service) when exclusion 
from use of the good as a penalty for failure to contribute to the cost of the 
project is technically impossible (as with national defense), impracticable (as 
with a city street), or simply unutilised (as with a toll-free bridge). In this 
circumstance (called "nonexcludability") one's benefit is largely independent of 
one's contribution, assuming a large enough community so that an individual's 
contribution would be small relative to the whole. Thus each individual has a 
choice of donating or not donating with approximately the same economic benefits 
(ignoring variables of social influence just now) in either case. "Rationality" 
then dictates that one not contribute. 
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consumption goods can be possible, normal models of individual decision 
calculus must be modified by three additions from social psychology: first, 
that interaction within any community is characterised by the establishment 
of leadership roles with their own rewards and obligations; second, that 
preferences (norms, opinions, tastes) can be influenced by reference group 
identifications; and third, that individuals receive real gratifications from 
14 social relationships. 
Let us assume that a felt-need for a collective consumption good 
exists within a community and that the government is either unwilling or 
unable to satisfy this need. Other things being equal, no individual will 
be willing to undertake the effort of organising self-help since he would prefer 
to let others do it and consume the benefits at no cost. However, other things 
are not equal. Some individuals are community leaders by consensus. Leaders 
are expected to lead, and they get gratification from doing so. Therefore 
failure to lead will weaken one's influence, imposing real costs to the 
individual in question. The strength of this effect will depend on the salience 
and intensity of the felt-need, so that leaders may be induced to accept 
organising roles for satisfying the need. Of course a leader can also introduce 
a project idea unrelated to a felt-need. Part of the leadership role in any 
group is to serve as a bearer of new ideas. 
Still organising a group to promote a self-help scheme is not the sJame 
as actually accomplishing the scheme. We must somehow overcome the free rider 
rationality which dictates that each individual should let others bear the cost 
of contributing so as to have the good made available at minimum cost to him-
self. This task can be accomplished by the community leaders. People who 
usually fulfill leadership roles are characteristically high status members 
of the community. This provides them with two channels for influencing the 
decision calculus of the rest of the community in favour of active participation 
in self-help activities. 
First, as mentioned above, high status individuals are generally 
opinion leaders (foci of reference identification) in the sense that others 
in the community tend to look toward high status people when forming attitudes 
and adopting norms. To the extent that individuals receive gratification from 
conforming to ideas of community leaders qua leaders, they can be induced to 
incur some cost (make some contribution) in the interests of conformity. 
Especially in Kenya with its strong leadership bonds, this aspect of social 
interaction must be recognised. 
14. For a detailed presentation of the behavioural, model discussed here, 
see 5 and 6. 
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Second, the leaders will be members of primary (face-to-face) groups. 
Such groups form the basis of man's social existence, and the gratifications 
derived from direct contact with other human beings require no comment. These 
gratifications, however, depend on face-to-face contacts being harmonious 
(consonant). Where dissonance is perceived, significant costs are imposed. 
These costs are usually not symetric. They depend on leader-follower roles 
established within each small group. Significant for our purposes is the 
tendency of high-status individuals in the community-at-large to be leaders 
within primary groups of which they are members. Thus they can impose real 
costs on other- members of the group and can influence behaviour through the 
introduction of norms and attitudes. Through what has been called by social 
psychologists the "strain toward symmetry" , non-leaders within a primary group 
will be willing to incur conformity costs to avoid disharmony. 
The ability of a leader to influence action, to affect the decision 
calculus of others, will depend on his status and also on the amount of 
communication he establishes concerning the particular norm. Also, since other 
individuals have other group connections within which they wish to maintain 
consonance, the effectiveness of leadership will often depend on the nature of 
the norm which is being communicated - its conformity to values anchored in 
other group memberships. Leadership is therefore circumscribed; we find that 
the influence relationship between leaders and followers is not a one-way 
channel, both in defining leadership roles and in determining the response to 
leadership communications. 
Data generated during the Long Vacation Internship Programme of the 
Department of Economics, University of Nairobi, has indicated that the role of 
leadership in Harambee activities in Kenya is consistent with the theory out-
lined above."1"5 In Table 1, we show the percentage of respondents in different 
16 categories who reported that they had "willingly contributed" to Harambee 
15. Participants in this programme were University students who had just 
completed their second or third year of study. The goal was to provide experience 
in the practical tasks of economics by allowing the students to define and pursue 
their own projects. Given this goal, supervision was purposely loose, leading to 
some data problems. In the project referred to here three locations in Kenya's 
Central Province- Muhoya, Nyeri District, Komothai, Kiambu District, and Chogoria, 
Meru District— were studied to see if willingness to contribute to Harambee projects 
correlated with various economic and social variables. It should be noted that the 
results (136 respondents) are probably biased slightly toward high willingness to 
give due to a bias in sampling procedure: the students chose to begin their sample at 
a Harambee project site and work outward. Thus people living near the project are 
over-represented. The data is presented here with the permission of Messrs.Clifford 
Gitari, Peter N. Gitau, and Peter G. Karuthiru, who ran the project. 
16. A negative reply could be either an unwilling contribution or no contribu-
tion at all. The data unfortunately does not distinguish between these alternatives. 
Still it does provide a useful test of the extent of voluntary contributions. 
IDS/DP 19 8 
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secondary schools or health centres. "Willing" was defined according to the 
respondents' own perceptions, which were felt to provide the best definition. 
Question A responses show that those who had contributed at a fund raising 
rally were far more likely to give willingly than these who had not attended 
such a rally. Very similar results are found where a contribution was made 
at a rally chaired by a national leader (question B). Even more striking, 
question C shows that of those who personally knew a local leader speaking at 
a rally, over 90% had willingly contributed to projects, as opposed to only 
50% of those who did not know a leader. In all three cases, the difference 
in the means is fully significant statistically. This implies that social 
pressures— both through primary group relations and reference, identification— 
17 were quite important determinants of people's willingness to give. 
Given that influence will depend on the leaders' status and 
communications and on the nearness of the communicated norms to socially 
anchored values, an individual's willingness to contribute should also be 
affected by benefits which the project in question will yield—either direct 
benefits to himself or indirect benefits to others with whom he identifies 
18 
strongly (e.g. family). As the free rider theory suggests, an individual's 
contribution will have a negligible impact on the benefits to be made available; 
therefore we cannot expect him to contribute as quid pro quo for benefits to be 
received. However, his willingness to respond to social pressure will be 
influenced by the perceived benefits of the project. 
This same factor will influence the willingness of the leaders to 
respond to felt-needs. Given a degree of socially induced incentive to take 
action, a leader's willingness to accept a responsible role will be affected 
by the benefits (aside from those connected with leadership per se) to himself 
of having the project made available. Thus there is an implicit bias in self-
help activity favouring projects with higher returns for the leadership group, 
other things being equal. 
The perceived benefits from having a project completed will be related 
to the probability of success of the project. Contributing to a project which 
is unlikely to succeed is a losing proposition. The perceived likelihood of 
success will itself depend on the leadership, the nature of the project (corres-
« 
pondence to felt-needs or cultural values) and the nature of the organisation. 
17. Of course this is not proof, since the direction of causation underlying 
the correlation is not unambiguous. It is possible that those who were willing to 
give were the ones who chose to attend the rally. 
18. We can also include here any possible direct utility benefits from the 
act of giving in and of itself. 
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Table 1. 
Question Contribution 
referring to 
HS or HC 
Response 
to Ques-
tion 
Respondent 
contributed 
willingly 
(%) 
No. Resp. 
in Cate-
gory 
Standard 
deviation 
of mean 
Difference 
of means 
significant 
at x (%) 
level 
A. Did you HS 
contribute 
at a fund 
Yes 85% 120 .03 99% 
No 50% 16 .12 
raising 
rally? H C Yes 80% . 121 .04 99% 
No 33% 15 .17 
B. Did you 
contribute 
at rally 
Yes 86% 124 .03 99% 
No 25% 12 .12 
national ^ 
leader? 
Yes 79% 124 .03 99% 
No 25% 12 .12 
C. Did local HS 
leader speaking 
at rally know 
you personally? 
Yes 95% 90 .02 
99% 
No 52% 46 .07 
HC 
Yes 90% 84 .03 
99% No 51% 52 .06 
D. Do you have ^^ 
children in 
primary 
school? 
Yes . 97% 94 .02 99% 
No 42% 42 .08 
E. Hospital near ^ 
home before 
contributing? 
Yes 69% 69 .06 
93% No 82% 67 .05 
F. Do wealthy ^^ 
give more than 
poor? 
Yes 83% 90 .04 less 
than 
90% 
No 76% 46 .06 
HC Yes 83% 90 .04 99% No 61% 46 .07 
G. Overall HS 81% 136 .03 N.R." 
HC 76% 136 .04 N.R. 
HS = Harambee Secondary School. 
HC = Harambee Health Centre. 
N.R. = Not Relevant. 
Source: Long Vacation Internship Programme, Dept. of Economics, 
University of Nairobi. Questionnaire Results. 
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People should be more willing to give through a cooperative, where everyone 
else gives as well, than on an individual basis. Similarly a fund raising 
drive using pledges, to be honoured only on attainment of a goal, will tend 
to be more successful than individual requests. Again people may well be 
willing to submit to taxation to provide for a collective consumption need, 
where they would be unwilling to contribute voluntarily, and in locales where 
everyone traditionally pitches in one is more willing-to do so himself (in 
addition to having higher dissonance costs from failing to contribute). Thus 
the more cohesive a community, the greater the chances of successful self-help 
activities. 
Finally, we might expect that voluntary contributions to the provision 
of a collective consumption good will bear a relation to the income of the 
donor. To the extent that the social pressures which are generated involve 
some notion of fair share, they will tend to induce larger contributions from 
wealthier members of a community. Even aside from this effect, a wealthier 
individual might be willing to offer a larger contribution in response to any 
given social pressure, assuming declining marginal utility of income. Any 
given psychic utility loss from failure to give should correspond to a larger 
absolute money value for the rich than for the poor. It must be stressed that we 
have ;bsbn .analysing only broad tendencies suggested by rudimentary social 
psychology and economics; exceptions to our arguments would certainly be expected. 
Given this theory of Harambee demonstrating how voluntary provision 
of collective goods can be a rational response to a set of economic and social 
circumstances, let us try to apply our understanding to a discussion of Kenyan 
Harambee. In the next section we shall try to explain some aspects of Harambee 
which have been raised in other discussions of the subject (being necessarily 
very selective in scope). Then we turn to the problem of controlling Harambee 
for more rational rural development. 
THE NATURE OF HARAMBEE IN KENYA 
We have tried to explain the nature of voluntary provision of collective 
goods, but in fact the opinion is often heard that Harambee schemes in Kenya 
simply are not voluntary. It is easy to find someone who knows of confiscated 
property or withheld school-fee receipts pending a contribution to self-help 
projects. In such cases the observations above would be inappropriate. The 
relevant analysis would examine not influence relationships , but power relationships 
"•'iiLi'in ' t'Ae community— not the ability of one individual (or group) to affect 
the behaviour of another, but the ability of the one to require behaviour from the 
V V 
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other. While the definition of voluntary action is notoriously difficult, 
we shall accept behaviour as voluntary if it is done willingly, even if it 
is a response to social pressure (translate as search for social gratification). 
Any behaviour perceived by the individual as unwillingly performed is certainly 
not voluntary; similarly activity undertaken upon threat of objective penalty. 
In contrast social costs are subjective, depending on the receptivity of the 
individual and the cohesiveness of his group identification, i.e. on internal 
perceptions, not external sanctions. To disallow social pressure would be 
to define most every decision as coerced, certainly defying normal usage of the 
word voluntary. 
So is Kenya's Harambee movement truly voluntary in this sense? Or 
do successful projects depend on coerced contributions and thus on a totally 
different set of conditions than those we have examined? Despite frequent 
comment to the contrary, I would doubt that the movement is largely supported 
by coercion. Prima facie evidence for this point of view is the mere fact 
that there appears to be a very real spirit of Harambee in Kenya. While the 
outsized Instituties of Technology seem to involve more formally required 
contributions, the continued vitality of local Harambee (and even the obvious 
difficulties of controlling it) indicates that it is still substantially a 
popular voluntary movement. 
During the early stages of the Internship Programme at the University 
of Nairobi, a seminar discussion on Harambee was held at which the view prevailed 
that these projects were not based on voluntary action; the students suggested 
that few people actually gave willingly, that coercion, property'confiscation, etc. 
was the norm. With this expectation, the students doing the survey on Harambee 
projects were very much surprised to find that the great majority of respondents 
(over 75%) said that they had willingly given to various projects and property 
19 v confiscation turned out to be insignificant. Furthermore, many people spoke 
with pride of the projects in their area and refused to admit that any project 
had failed, even when no progress had been made for a considerable period of 
time. This would certainly not be true if contributions had been squeezed out 
19. As noted (fn. 16) "unwilling" could be giving without wanting to or not 
giving at all. Confiscation was not tested empirically, so the comment in the text 
refers to qualitative impressions from the field work. It must be noted that ques-
tionnaire responses, as usual, do not necessarily provide "true" tests. Further-
more, data can be subject to various interpretations, in this case either "Aha! 
75% gave willingly," or "Aha! 25% did not give willingly." Since our expectation 
(in effect our null hypothesis) was that voluntarism was not extensive, the former 
interpretation seems to deserve the exclamation. Similarly, ambiguity attaches 
to the data presented below regarding benefits and willingness to give. 
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of the people. While the locations covered are not representative of all of 
20 
Kenya, the implication is clear— reports of coercion are probably much 
exaggerated, at least insofar as local Harambee projects are concerned. 
Accepting that basically voluntary effort is involved, let. us 
examine three aspects of Harambee using the history and theory as guidelines: 
first, the origins of Harambee in Kenya; second, the nature of the interaction 
between leaders and the community; and finally the significance of contributions 
qua taxes. 
To begin, I would like to question the frequently heard assertion 
that Harambee in Kenya has its roots in tribal community spirit. As John 
Anders on (2, p. 106) has put it: "The origins of self-help activities in 
Kenya can be traced back to the age-grade structures and patterns of communal 
government and responsibility which featured in so many of her traditional 
societies." But given the'fact that self-help school movements are found in 
many diverse cultures, including the American Colonies (and even the Kenyan 
Indian community in the early 20th century), it is probably more appropriate 
to suggest that the origins of Kenya's self-help lie in normal sociological' 
reactions to felt-needs. It is simply rational human behaviour among social 
(as opposed to economic) men which is at the root of Harambee. What is special 
about Kenya's tribal tradition, then, is not self-help, but the spirit of cohesive-
ness which characterises tribal identifications, producing a very strong set of 
social pressures in favour of contributions to collective activity. 
A second point I should like to make refers to the preoccupation with 
the politics of Harambee in recent papers on the subject. The prevailing opinion 
is nicely captured in a remark made by the Minister of Labour, quoted in Keller 
(15, p.14): "...though I am not very happy with what they are doing, I am 
building these schools.... This is political and cannot be helped." Most commen-
tators see the motivation for involvement of politicians as "personal political 
ambitions", or attempts to "help maintain and perhaps even broaden their own 
political bases". Anderson (3, p.162) suggests that the paradox of government 
leaders encouraging Harambee which contradicts official government policy is due 
to a sophisticated political scheme to control local energies while weakening 
local leadership which threatens the central administration. Godfrey and Mutiso 
(13, p. 18) even hint that the role of "non-politicians" (their own term) 
involved in Institutes of Technology "may become clearer when the> candidates 
for the 1974 elections declare themselves". 
20. A fourth location in Western Kenya was also covered by the project, 
but the replies had to be disregarded due to irregularities in the data collection. 
16 -
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In contrast, our historical case studies certainly suggest the 
possibility that non-political motivations can be important aspects of leader-
ship. Our theory of sociological motivations would also predict just about 
the same behaviour on the part of leaders (e.g., organisation of high-status 
committees; public expressions of support combined with private misgivings) 
which we in fact observe in Kenya. In addition, according to the Internship 
Programme research results, project initiation was largely in the hands of 
21 
non-politicians in the surveyed areas. Politics might tell the whole 
story about Harambee leadership if political gains were the only rewards from 
leadership, but as we have seen, leadership offers its own gratifications, 
and sociological gratifications (fulfilling one's role as community leader) 
are probably far more salient in most cases than political gains which might 
depend on the hope that the community's political memory will last until the 
next (often undated) election. 
While not meaning to deny that such leadership provides a spring-
board for later political gains, nor that politics is a significant aspect 
of leadership behaviour, I believe that the emphasis on .political motivation 
has been overplayed. Politics has its role, but Harambee is just as much an 
economic and social phenomenon. Thus where Godfrey and Mutiso (13, p.4) state 
that a Harambee secondary school is an ideal project, "combining a large expected 
private payoff for its contributors... with a handsome political payoff for its 
main sponsors", I would suggest that the social payoffs are probably of more 
22 direct importance than the political payoffs. 
Another common observation regarding Harambee activities is that the 
rural populace is being taken for a ride by the elite who benefit the most 
from the projects which are established. Regarding the Institutes of Technology 
Godfrey and Mutiso suggest that Harambee is degenerating into regressive taxation, 
23 
transferring resources from the poor to the wealthy, and Anderson (2) claims 
that the finance of Harambee secondary schools exacerbates inequalities within 
21. Politicians (38% of responses) finish a poor third to administrators (85%) 
and "other local leaders" (54-%) in answer to the question "Who initiates projects 
in your area?". 
22. Contrast the Godfrey/Mutiso position with Mbithi (17, p.158) who states 
that the social sphere is the sole determinant of social interaction. 
23. This fact may be true regarding the Institutes. It should be noted that 
transfers from the poor to those who can mobilise resources has been a standard 
basis of economic development in all of the developed world, though it certainly 
is not in the spirit of African Socialism. 
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the community since only the relatively rich will be able to afford fees. 
Where contributions are based on coercion (which Godfrey and Mutiso link to 
financing of the Institutes) a result of this sort would be expected, but 
with voluntary finance it might be asked whether this is very likely. 
From our theory we see that the response to self-help activity 
will depend on both the strength of pressures to conform (which themselves 
depend significantly on. the benefits to the community) and the benefits 
accruing to the individual from the project. We should expect, then, that 
contributions would conform broadly to benefits, but with enough latitude 
to favour the elite who are responsible for organising the effort and the 
communications which stimulate the social processes. It is unlikely, though, 
that sufficient community spirit would be generated to finance projects which 
actually were of no benefit to the poor majority. As Oyugi points out (21, 
p. 12), "It is generally accepted that popular participation depends upon the 
amount of direct benefit that the individual or family can hope to derive 
from the particular development project." 
We are not now asking about the optimality of the project selection 
and implementation, but rather about principles of finance. To the extent 
that people give because they value the good to be provided, Harambee contribu-
tions can be considered as a broadly conceived benefit tax, which has as much 
claim to ethical justification as any other basis for taxation. Also, to the 
extent that people give as a response to positive reference identifications, 
there will be no disutility associated with the contribution. Finally, where 
a contribution is a response to a direct social pressure, it may still be 
superior to taxation since it allows the individual to determine his own response 
as defined by his internal perceptions of the pressures. Of course where 
Harambee contributions are coerced, there is no correlation with benefit. 
While the underlying distribution of income may be lamented, we should recognise 
that Harambee finance might distribute the cost burden in a broadly defensible 
manner, insofar as contributions are indeed voluntary. 
However, do contributions actually relate to benefits? The first 
step toward answering this question is to recognise that benefits to the 
individuals involved are not confined to consumption of the service per se. 
An individual can also benefit (in a very real sense) from community pride, 
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24 or the knowledge that he himself helped to get something done. A poor man 
who contributes a small amount to a Harambee school, even though his children 
25 will be unable to attend, might still feel his contribution was warranted. 
Looking specifically at Harambee secondary schools, evidence compiled 
by Brownstein (10) brings into question Anderson's contention about the 
distribution of benefits. In a follow-up study of students who wrote the Kenya 
Preliminary Examination (given after seven years of primary school) during the 
years 1965-67, Brownstein found that those who went on to Harambee schools 
were very similar to the community at large in most key family characteristics. 
He concludes: 
The fact that there is no significant difference between the 
Harambee school group and those not in secondary school may reflect 
the fact that Harambee schools , which have been built by the community, 
more nearly reflect the community in composition than do other 
secondary schools. (10, pp. 59-60) 
26 
He correctly points out that his evidence is inconclusive, but 
it suggests the possibility that contributions and benefits do not affect 
distribution as adversely as is often supposed. 
Additional indicative evidence of a relationship between benefits 
and contributions appears in Table 1. Question D shows that of those who had 
children of primary school age, 97% willingly contributed to Harambee secondary 
schools, as opposed to only 4-2% of those without primary school children. The 
very significant difference between these means demonstrates a strong relation-
ship between potential benefit and attitudes toward participation in the self-
help effort. Again, referring to health' centre projects (question F) we find 
a significant difference in terms of willingness to contribute between those who 
27 did and those who did not have a hospital near their homes before contributing. 
24. Batten (4,chapter 2) describes a case in which a social development 
officer was approached by the people of a poor community who wanted to build 
a library. When it was finished, no one wanted to use it. Its only benefit 
(and apparently the reason it was wanted in the first place) was as a source 
of pride for the community;. Batten's case studies also strongly support the 
idea that leaders cannot successfully push through a self-help project for 
which people perceive no particular benefit, 
25. The extreme form of the argument would be: "Who is to say that Egypt's 
pyramids were a waste of scarce resources?" 
26. In fact it contradicts less precise evidence given by Anderson (2, p.171) 
who finds that families of Harambee school students tend to be disproportionately 
representative of the wealth/ families of the community 
27. Here the term "near" was left to be defined by the individual's perception. 
It appears curious that 69% of those who already had a hospital near home gave a 
willing contribution anyway. Asked for an explanation, virtually all respondents 
answered that they expected the Haramb ee health centre to be nearer home and to offer 
better services; 86% expected it to be cheaper; and 64% said they gave because every-
one else was doing so, 
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This finding also tends to suggest that contributions are influenced by-
benefits. Finally, though not directly related to benefits, it is interesting 
to note that 94% of the respondents stated that the wealthy were in general 
expected to give more than the poor. Though a lower proportion (66%) believed 
that the wealthy actually did give more, we find (question F) that willingness 
to contribute is closely related to this belief. People who believed that 
the wealthy made larger contributions were more prepared to contribute than 
were those who denied the proposition. This finding is consistent with the 
comment of the managers of the Philadelphia Hospital that citizens had given 
"according to their circumstances". 
Generally then, we find many Harambee projects will tend to raise 
money in a way which, while certainly not progressive, is at least related 
broadly to benefits and possibly to ability-to-pay as well. While we have 
proven nothing we do find reason to doubt the usual rhetoric about Harambee 
financing. 
In this section we have tried to utilise our theory, a few historical 
cases and a modicum of empirical findings about Harambee to gain insight into 
the nature of self-help activity in Kenya. In doing so we have found that a 
number of prevailing opinions about Harambee are called into question. Now 
we turn to the most important issue— the need to control Harambee activity in 
the interests of rational resource use. 
CONTROL OF HARAMBEE 
Most observers of Harambee are quick to point out that self-help 
activities frequently result in waste and diversion of scarce rural resources 
and energies from uses which would be more beneficial for rural development. 
A typical commentary is that of Heyer, et.al. (14, p.34): "There is an enormous 
amount of local funds and labour that people will readily contribute for projects.... 
It is important that these local contributions be directed into useful develop-
ment activities." Given the analysis presented above, can we say anything 
about the causes of misdirected efforts and possible means of redirecting self-
help activity? 
Theoretically, the foremost cause of wasteful effort is simply myopic 
perceptions of benefits. Analyses of "market failure" have stressed divergences 
between individual evaluations of benefits and the true social advantages of 
alternative activities. Especially where preferences are distorted by social 
pressures, there is no reason to expect that self-help will result in a rational 
use of resources. 
- 20 
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In Kenya it seems that project choice, and therefore resource 
utilisation, is further distorted by perceptions of government policy. From 
the case of the provision of the Philadelphia Hospital and from our theory, 
it is apparent that perceived government pledges of support, which increase 
the likelihood of success for a project, will encourage voluntary effort. 
In reality, many Kenyan Harambee activities seem to be chosen with an obvious 
eye toward government assistance. As Oyugi (21, p.6) has shown, "as in other 
parts of Kenya, several major projects have been completed in Migori that 
still are not operational because the communities can neither equip nor staff 
them. Everything was based on the unrealistic hope that eventually-the 
government would take them over." And as Anderson (2, p.116) has argued, a 
major source of pressure for capital development of Harambee schools is the 
belief that the chance of government take-over is increased by having more 
brick buildings. Given the perceptions, the response is quite rational; 
diversion of resources is exacerbated by ambiguous, vacilating or poorly 
communicated government policy which allows the misleading perceptions to take 
2 8 
on a force of their own. In fact the Kenya government has, just recently, 
taken a significant step in this direction by specifying the conditions under 
which primary schools built through local self-help efforts will be taken over. 
Assuming that this unnecessary bias could be eliminated by straight-
forward presentation of explicit, credible government policy, are there any 
positive actions which can be taken to improve the selection of projects (as 
opposed to simply removing the government-induced tendency to wasteful-
ness)? The answer lies in the flexibility which characterises the relation-
ship between leadership and community attitudes. 
The theory set out above, as well as case studies of community 
development efforts throughout the developing world (see 4), establishes that 
leadership is constrained in project selection by the needs perceived by the 
community. As stated earlier, however, one aspect of the leadership role is 
the ability to introduce new attitudes, norms and ideas, The case of the 
Philadelphia Hospital illustrated this point. In effect the perceived needs 
of the community are not fixed, but elastic within limits. This point is 
28. A closely related problem is that of curriculum choice. Again the 
inappropriate offerings are not a result of Harambee irrationality itself, but 
also of misdirected government policy. Here the exam system, which provides the 
sole validation for education, distorts the choice. 
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illustrated by a study (cited in 1, p. 101) of attitudes in Britain: whereas 
most people thought taxes were too high, they felt at the same time that 
expenditures were too low. Thus the range of collective consumption activities 
for which people will perceive real benefit exceeds the community's ability 
to provide finance, so that some room exists for careful manipulation of felt-
needs in the direction of projects which not only satisfy the community, but 
also conform more closely to socially desirable uses of community resources. 
Of interest in this regard is the finding, reported by Batten (4, 
chapter 5), that self-help projects can gain strong support from reference 
communications from respected individuals such as government community 
development officers. If as Oyugi suggests (21, p. 11), "no project can be 
completed in which a sub-chief does not exert his authority", then sub-chiefs 
and other community leaders must be influential in defining perceived needs. 
Therein lies hope of improving the choice of self-help activities, but this 
would require far more coordination than presently exists between the centre 
29 and the lowest levels of authority. 
In sum, the economics and sociology of self-help regarding collective 
consumption goods suggests that the obvious waste generated by Harambee can 
conceivably be reduced through government policy— policy to remove the bias 
toward waste induced by government ambivalence and policy to direct energies 
toward more useful activities. Any attempt to direct energy to a project with 
little perceivable benefit to the community will have slight chance of success 
at best, but the range of activities for which true benefits are generated is 
certainly wide enough. 
A policy of this sort would, however, be only an interim improvement 
(and certainly not optimisation) of resource use. The history of American 
primary education, for example, suggests that the final resolution of the 
Harambee "problem" is direct government control of vital public services. 
Revitalisation of local community government may be the long run solution, 
but in the cases of American primary education and fire control in Philadelphia 
the self-help spirit led to a prolongation of government apathy. Especially 
in a developing country such as Kenya where, as the public finance literature 
makes clear, lack of revenue sources (tax handles) limits government activity, 
this danger is real, 
29. It has been pointed out to me by Dr. Judith Heyer that the scope of Harambee 
projects which can be implemented by local efforts is further limited by the local 
leaders lack of technological know-how. A bridge over a swampy ravine may be quite 
useful, yet beyond the capabilities of the local group. Thus government technological 
assistance, in addition to coordination, may be necessary to direct Harambee efforts 
in the most fruitful directions. 
22 
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One is led to ask further whether local government finance would 
truly represent a long-run solution. In the first place, while Harambee 
efforts are not likely to use resources optimally, no one suggests that 
optimisation is to be expected from government either. And for elected govern-
ments, voting theory quite clearly demonstrates that voting procedures, far 
from being optimal, can even be irrational (i.e. internally inconsistent). 
Secondly, local government in Kenya outside the municipalities seems to have 
been a failure as demonstrated by the takeover of responsibility for primary 
education, health and secondary roads by the central government. 
Still, governmental take-over of Harambee efforts is needed in the 
long run, primarily in the interests of stability. Voluntary support of 
projects tends to be uncertain over a period of years, particularly where the 
number of projects is proliferating. Normalisation of finance through taxation 
and normalisation of administration in the hands of a legal authority can 
reduce the possibility of wasteful abandonment of projects. Of course the 
political authority can be corrupt, but obviously Harambee leaders can be corrupt 
as well. When Harambee leaders are not trusted, support for projects lapses; 
when governmental leaders are not trusted, projects can still be maintained. 
Furthermore, government leaders are to some extent answerable to their 
constituents. Project continuity is not so closely tied to personalities as 
it is in the case of Harambee activity. 
In the near future effective local government at the village level may 
not be feasible due to manpower constraints. Thus central government take-over 
is now the norm. Yet as the scope of local services expands with development* 
local elections and votes on local issues would probably serve the diversity of 
preference between communities better than central government decisions. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has been a rather wide-ranging and fairly abstract effort. 
I have tried to demonstrate interesting parallels between Harambee activity in 
Kenya and self-help activities in the United States. A theory of voluntary 
effort was set out stressing the rewards and costs of social interaction as 
antidote to the sterile conclusions of traditional economic theory on the 
provision of collective consumption goods. Finally these analyses were used 
to question some prevailing opinions about the nature of Harambee in Kenya and 
to explore possible ways of redirecting this enormous energy less wastefully. 
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Before closing, a final word is necessary about the very real 
possibility that Harambee contributions are in fact coerced by local leaders, 
rather than given voluntarily. As already mentioned, coercion seems to be 
involved to some extent in collections for the Institutes of Technology, but 
concern is often voiced that it has become equally characteristic of small-
scale local projects. The evidence presented above, while covering very 
recent cases, is not sufficiently broad-based to rule out this possibility. 
To the extent that coercion is the basis of contributions, the analysis and 
the conclusions given here are inapplicable. No longer could it be argued 
that Harambee projects must be based on community needs ; no longer could it 
be argued that self-help contributions are justifiable as a principle of public 
finance. The need for government control in this instance would be most 
pressing in order to eliminate the extralegal compulsion which may be applied, 
possibly to the detriment of general welfare. 
In conclusion we should reiterate one point which has been basic 
to all of our analysis: that Harambee is inevitably a non-optimal use of 
30 
resources. Judging it by ideal standards will not be terribly fruitful, 
given the very real existence of the spirit of self-help. As a more 
realistic alternative, existing Harambee should be judged against feasible 
redirections. I agree with Brownstein's comment (10, p. 164) that the 
government should worry if people stop building Harambee schools. The 
government should accept this vitality and try to use it to benefit the rural 
areas where scope for improvement certainly exists. 
30. Or by standards set by government activities. For example, Keller's 
debate points comparing Harambee schools to aided schools (15, p.30 cf.) are 
not as germane as Anderson's concern that increases in self-help activity drain 
resources from such tasks as land development and crop spraying. ~(2, p.117). 
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